A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes that can has no fixed or predetermined topology, with mobile nodes and dynamic membership changes. A selforganizing network is a network that can automatically extend, change, configure and optimize its topology, coverage, capacity, cell size, and channel allocation, based on changes in location, traffic pattern, interference, and the situation or environment. MANETs due to complete autonomy of the member nodes and lack of any centralized infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to different types of attacks and security threats. Packet drop attack is one of them. In this paper mechanism has been proposed to detect and defend against packet drop attacks. Simulation has been done using ns 2.34 to evaluate the conventional AODV and proposed algorithm when packet drop attack is injected in network. The Result indicates that our proposed solution gives significant better performance then AODV in concern of Packet delivery ratio & Throughput with tolerable increase in routing overhead, End to End delay.
INTRODUCTION
This Wireless ad-hoc networks are self-possessed of sovereign nodes that are self-managed devoid of any infrastructure. In this way, ad-hoc networks have a dynamic topology such that nodes can effortlessly link or abscond the network at any time. They have many potential applications, especially, in military and rescue areas such as connecting soldiers on the battlefield or establishing a new network in place of a network which collapsed after a disaster like an earthquake. Ad-hoc networks are suitable for areas where it is not possible to set up a fixed infrastructure. Since the nodes conversing with each other without an infrastructure, they provide the connectivity by forwarding packets over themselves.
To support this connectivity, nodes use some routing protocols such as AODV [1] (Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) in category of reactive protocol [1] [2] , DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) and DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector).Due to dynamic nature of MANETs, nodes may exhibit various types of misbehavior. Node misbehavior may be categorized into two broad types: Malicious behavior and Selfish behavior. : Malicious behavior intention is to attack and damage the network and Selfish behavior intention is to save power, memory and CPU cycle.
Malicious misbehavior can be of two types: Forwarding misbehavior and routing misbehavior. Forwarding misbehavior intention is to packet dropping, modification, fabrication, timing attack, silent route change etc. where ad Routing misbehavior intention is to route salvaging, dropping of error messages, fabrication of error messages, unusually frequent route updates, sleep deprivation, black hole, gray hole, wormhole etc.
Black hole attack is a routing misbehavior attack, In this attack attacker replies to each RREQ packet of route discovery with the greatest sequence number that it can. Then source node selects the greatest RREP sequence number and also selects the route contained in that RREP packet. Attacker tries to spoof ID of destination node and by using a high sequence number in RREP, flows all data packets to itself.
Black Hole Attack and Classification
A Black Hole attack [3] [4] [5] is a sort of denial of service where a malicious node Adversary selectively drops only data packets, but still participates in the routing protocol correctly using method to pull towards all packets by incorrectly declaring a fresh route to the destination and then absorb them without forwarding them to the destination. Cooperative Black hole means the malicious nodes act in a team [6] [7] . When Source node initiates the transmission a data packets to a destination, as a process first sends the route discovery packet (RREQ) to all its neighbors' node. Malicious nodes is actively participates in routing process receives the RREQ as a consequences Black hole nodes have the characteristic of responding it immediately send out the RREP Packets. The RREP from the Black hole reaches the source node, well at the forefront of the other RREPs. Now on receiving the RREP from the Black hole node, the source initiates transmitting the data packets. On the reception of data packets, the Black hole node simply drops them, instead of forwarding to the destination. In an ad-hoc network that uses the AODV protocol, a black hole node perform as if to have brand new enough routes to all destinations requested by all the nodes and sop up the network traffic. When a source node broadcasts the RREQ message for any destination, the black hole node immediately responds with an RREP message that includes the highest sequence number and this message is perceived as if it is coming from the destination or from a 
Classifications of Black hole attack
The method is indicating how malicious node hysterics in the data routes varies. Fig. 1 shows how Single black hole problem arises, here node "S" want to send data packets to node "D" and initiate the route discovery process. So if node "C" is a malicious node then it will claim that it has active route to the specified destination as soon as it receives RREQ packets. It will then send the response to node "A" before any other node. In this way node "A" will think that this is the active route and thus active route discovery is complete. Node "A" will ignore all other replies and will start seeding data packets to node "C". In this way all he data packet will be lost consumed or lost. Where Fig 2 shows collaborative black hole problem arise when multiple malicious node are performing in coordination with each other. from refers to one if its squad mates M2 as the next hop as depicted in fig 2 when S node initiate the route discovery process, as a result S will consider that S-4-M1-M2 is the secure route towards the destination. After getting packets from "M1" its team mate "M2" simply drops the packets.
Fig 1 Single Black Hole

Fig 2 Collaborative Black Hole
However the case is packets are obsessive by M1 and packet drop activities of network is being compromised
Related Work
In this section, reviewed has been performed for the several solutions to black hole attacks. Several authors have suggested some techniques to detect and prevent multiple packet drop attack. Ming-yang at.al [8] discussed a mechanism called anti-black hole mechanism based upon abnormal difference between RREQs and RREPs transmitted from the node.Y.F.et.al [9] proposed Intruding Detection using anomaly detection(IDAD) based upon pre collected anomaly activities called audit data. In satoshi K et.al [10] have introduced anomalies detection scheme to detect black hole attack based upon dynamic training method.
Authors Techniques
Drawbacks
Deng H,Li W.and Agrawal [12] Including the address of the next hop node in RREP Packet
The next hope node can response to the source node with untrustworthy routing information. 
Proposed Solutions
No node should be detected falsely malicious as well as no hole should be estimated as non-malicious node [15] . Keeping these two extremes in mind new fair algorithm is formed which is as bellow. In our algorithm source node will issue a inquisition message to detect malicious node only when it found no of packets received by destination is notably less than the no of packets actually sent.
We propose to modify AODV protocol by introducing two more tables which is maintained at each node. First one is Table  Whenever Source node wish to commence the black hole detection and removal process it broadcasts a query message to all its neighbors and set timers for the receipt of the result message from the monitoring nodes. The result comes as per the observation table which is managed by all nodes.
Let ∞ be the threshold probability of non malicious packets drop by each node then each monitor node check if (ni (1-∞)<=dataCount) then it is not a suspected node. If at the next node data loss is ∞ then the next node actually forwards ni (1-∞)*(1-∞) as a result total data loss via packet drop is (ni -ni (1-∞)N) where N is the total number of nodes in the route. Therefore,
∞=1-(1-∞)N Case A:
In AODV the node that receives the RREP, checks the value of sequence number in routing table and accepts if it has a higher RREP seq_no than the one in routing table, Extra Method has been added to check whether the RREP seq_no is higher than the threshold value (A value that is updated dynamically in time intervals). As the value of RREP seq_no is found to be higher than the threshold value, the node is suspected to be malicious and added to the Observation List with the status field Su The threshold value is dynamically updated using the data collected in the time interval. If the initial training data were used it is implausible for the routers to adapt changes in environment. This case will detect black hole attack if it is in form of Single black hole attack. 
Broadcast to all neighbors
Go to End
ELSE
Go to End End
Case B:
In case of Collaborative black hole attack Case A will not be sufficient. Assume the observation Where Source node might be anything and next node is same.
Return status to all other node: Su
Broadcast status to all neighbors.
Go to End
ELSE
Go to End End
After receiving status of each node imitator or neighbor node will follow the procedure as per follows.In case of non receipt of status message wait until the tolerable time and threshold value. Due to network nature appropriate number of endeavor is required before classifying nodes as misbehaving. For this cause Every of the nodes are given MT( Maximum tolerance) number of opportunities before they are attributed as Black hole node in case of non receipt of status field.
Procedure: Begin
If status filed is S u then THEN ADD the Node ID in to Black hole list.
Broadcast to all neighbors
Go to End ELSE
Go to End
If status filed is N n then THEN
Consider node as a Non malicious node ELSE
Go to End
End
In case of non receipt of status message wait until the tolerable time and threshold value. Due to network nature appropriate number of endeavor is required before classifying nodes as misbehaving. For this cause Every of the nodes are given MT( Maximum tolerance) number of opportunities before they are attributed as Black hole node in case of non receipt of status field..
Simulation Setup
In our evaluation, Comparison has been made for the performances of AODV and AODV-GAP using Network Simulator -2.34 (NS-2) [14] . The details of simulation environment and the performance metrics are specified in the following subsections. About ten scenarios with different node positions, mobility and speed have been simulated and tested. The network parameters were measured with the presence of 0 to 10 malicious nodes. The network parameters Packet delivery fraction (PDF), End-to-End delay(E2Ed) and Network Routing Overload(NRL) and route discovery time (RDT) has been taken as evaluation parameters.
At the lower layer means physical and data link layer, it has been used IEEE 802.11 with Two Ray Ground radio propagation model. Consideration of the traffic of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) data packets over UDP at the transport layer in a of 1000m x 1000m with the total number of nodes varies as per scenarios forming the ad hoc network. 
Result Analysis
Ns-2 creates agents for the various network objects, including the router, CBR source, physical interface and so forth. Each of these agents log data which contains at least the minimal information in trace file .(tr file).
The calculation of the packet delivery fraction uses the ratio of the total number of CBR packets received in the network to the total number of CBR packets sent during the simulation. Another parameter is Network Load (NRL) is more or less same as compare with AODV normal and AODV with attack. Variation comes because of Status field whenever Source node queries related to detect black hole attack in the network. As per our proposed solution source node will initiate query that time extra packets transmission has to be performed. Due to that transmission NRL is slightly higher than normal AODV protocol. 
Conclusions
In this Paper, it has been analyzed effect of the Black Hole in an AODV Network with Single Black hole attack and collaborative black hole attack. For this purpose, In this simulation implementation has been done of an AODV protocol that behaves as Black Hole in NS-2. Simulation has been done simulated several scenarios with nodes ranging from 10 to 60 that use AODV protocol and also simulated the same scenarios after introducing ten black Hole Node into the network. Moreover, implementation has been done for a proposed solution that attempted to mitigating the black Hole effects in NS-2 and simulated the solution using the same scenarios. The simulation results are analyzed below.
Having simulated the black Hole Attack, we saw that the packet loss is increased in the ad-hoc network due to nature of attack.. Its also affects the overall network connectivity and the data loss could show the existence of the black Hole Attack in the network. If the number of black Hole Nodes is increased then the data loss would also be expected to increase. These two results show that our solution mitigating the black Hole effects efficiently in stipulations of PDF, AED, Routin Discovery Time and Routing overhead
